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EVIDENCE-CONFESSIONS-ADMISSIBILITY OF A SUBSEQUENT CONFESSION 
UNDER. THE McNABB-MALLORY DoCTRINE--Defendant was indicted for first 
degree murder and convicted of manslaughter in the Federal District 
Court for the District of Columbia. Defendant had willingly directed 
the police to the victim's body and voluntarily signed a written confession 
during a period of thirty-four hours detention prior to arraignment. At 
the arraignment defendant was informed of his rights and indicated that 
he was aware of them; in addition, the preliminary hearing was postponed 
in order to provide him opportunity to obtain counsel. Twenty hours 
after his arraignment the defendant once again voluntarily confessed while 
giving a police officer instructions as to the disposition of the victim's body. 
At the trial the first confession was excluded because it was made during a 
period of illegal detention;1 however, the second confession was admitted 
as evidence upon a finding by the judge that it was voluntary and in-
dependent of the first one. On appeal, held, reversed and remanded for 
a new trial.2 A subsequent confession, obtained soon after the rendition of 
1 FED. R. CruM:. P. 5(a). 
2 The court sitting en bane was split, with four judges dissenting, and one judge 
concurring with the majority for the reasons stated in the majority opinion and for 
the additional reasons stated in his own concurring opinion. Principal case at 248. 
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an inadmissible confession, and before the defendant has the aid of counsel, 
is inadmissible. Killough v. United States, 315 F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir. 1962). 
Two exclusionary doctrines are applied in the federal courts to render 
confessions inadmissible. On the one hand, confessions induced by coercive 
methods are excluded because their admission constitutes a violation of due 
process of law. The underlying rationale for holding coerced confessions 
inadmissible has been that confessions so obtained are involuntary and un-
reliable; however, these two conditions are not of equivalent significance, 
as confessions made involuntarily are inadmissible even though their ac-
curacy can be independently substantiated.3 Initially, the coerced confession 
doctrine excluded only those confessions obtained by force, threat of force, 
or a promise of leniency,4 but recently it has been extended to include 
prolonged questioning as a ground for exclusion where the pressure was 
only psychological rather than physical.5 In contrast to the constitutional 
invalidation of coerced confessions is the exclusionary rule, applicable only 
in federal courts,6 based upon Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, which requires that after arrest the accused must be taken be-
fore a commissioner for arraignment "without unnecessary delay." In a 
series of decisions, primarily McNabb,1 Upshaw,8 and Mallory,9 the Su-
preme Court has formulated this doctrine which, in effect, renders in-
admissible any confession obtained while the defendant was being detained 
in violation of Rule 5(a).10 Although some federal courts have suggested 
the likelihood that extended detention will result in coercive police 
methods,11 the rule itself is not based on constitutional grounds;12 indeed, 
no inquiry is made as to the existence of coercion once "unnecessary delay" 
8 McCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 111, at 232 (1954). Reliability of a confession is immaterial; 
it must be voluntary and not be induced by unfair police measures. Watts v. Indiana, 
338 U.S. 49, 50 n.2 (1949). Cf. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1951); Lisenba v. 
California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941); Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542 (1897). 
4 Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936). Unfair police methods sufficient for ex-
clusion are: the fear of mob violence, e.g., Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958); threats 
of bodily harm, e.g., Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 406 (1945); use of physical force, 
e.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936); pressures of bargains for leniency, e.g., 
Crawford v. United States, 219 F.2d 207 (5th Cir. 1955). 
IS Physical harm or threat of violence is not a necessity for finding the confession 
involuntary. See Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1956). For the general development 
of these standards, see Maguire, "Involuntary" Confessions, 31 TuL. L. REv. 125 (1956); 
Comment, 27 FORDHAM L. REv. 396 (1958). 
6 But see People v. Hamilton, 359 Mich. 410, 102 N.W.2d 738 (1960). 
7 McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943). 
s Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410 (1948). 
9 Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957). 
10 The Supreme Court has the power to formulate rules of evidence applicable to 
the administration of federal criminal trials. 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (Supp. III, 1961). See Wolfe 
v. United States, 291 U.S. 7 (1934). 
11 Unlawful detention was thought to give the police the opportunity to apply un-
fair pressure before the defendant had the benefit of being informed of his rights by 
the commissioner. United States v. Carignan, 342 U.S. 36, 45 (1951). 
12 See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 476 (1953); United States v. Mitchell, 322 U.S. 
65, 68 (1944); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943). 
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has been shown.13 Instead, the McNabb-Mallory doctrine is a rule of per 
se inadmissibility designed primarily to deter federal officers from using 
pre-arraignment detention as an investigative device.14 
Subsequent confessions, following a coerced confession, are not neces-
sarily inadmissible. Admission of the subsequent confession into evidence 
is conditioned on a showing that it was voluntary and independent of the 
earlier coerced confession.15 Among the factors considered by the courts in 
determining the voluntariness and independence of a subsequent confes-
sion, the following appear to be the most significant: the elapsed time be-
tween the two confessions,16 the role of the authorities in inducing the 
second confession,17 the degree of spontaneity displayed in making the 
second confession,18 and the existence of an opportunity to consult with 
counsel.19 The rationale for the application of these particular factors 
seems to be coincident with the rationale for the exclusion of the initial 
confession, in that these factors are designed to test whether elements of 
coercion which induced the first confession contributed to the rendition 
of the subsequent admission of guilt. 
Generally, the federal courts seem to analyze the circumstances of a 
subsequent confession in the same manner whether the original con-
fession was actually coerced or simply inadmissible under the McNabb-
Mallory doctrine. Three illegal detention cases decided prior to the prin-
cipal case dealt with subsequent confessions. In the first, United States v. 
Bayer,20 the Supreme Court upheld the admission of a second confession 
made six months after an inadmissible confession was obtained. Although 
the Court recognized the psychological pressure on a defendant once he 
has let the "cat out of the bag," it concluded that the making of a con-
fession under circumstances which precludes its introduction into evidence 
will not perpetually disable the confessor from making an admissible dec-
laration of guilt after the conditions invalidating the earlier confession 
13 "[A] confession is inadmissible if made during illegal detention due to failure 
promptly to carry a prisoner before a committing magistrate, whether or not the 'con-
fession is the result of torture, physical or psychological .•. .' " Upshaw v. United States, 
335 U.S. at 413. 
14 McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943). This requirement of a prompt 
hearing has been codified in Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure; 
however, pre-arraignment confessions made during necessary delays have been held admis-
sible. See Porter v. United States, 258 F.2d 685 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 
906 (1959) (commissioner unavailable, office closed for the night); Mallory v. United 
States, 354 U.S. 449, 455 (1957) (dictum) (delay to check and verify defendant's story). 
15 McCORMICK, op. cit. supra note 3, § 114. See Watts v. United States, 278 F.2d 247 
(D.C. Cir. 1960). 
16 United States v. Gottfried, 165 F.2d 360, 366-67 (2d Cir. 1948); cf. United States 
v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 541 (1947). 
17 See Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596, 604-05 (1944). 
18 See, e.g., Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 191 (1952); Lyons v. Oklahoma, supra 
note 17, at 604-05. 
19 United States v. Morin, 265 F.2d 241, 245-46 (3d Cir. 1959). 
20 331 U.S. 532 (1947). 
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are removed.21 The other two cases, Goldsmith v. United States22 and 
Jackson v. United States,23 were recently decided by the Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia, as was the principal case. In Goldsmith the 
defendants affirmed the barred confession upon return from the prelimi-
nary hearing in a colloquy with one of the persons robbed. This oral con-
fession was admitted on the basis that it was voluntary and not the fruit 
of the original confession.24 And in Jackson the defendant orally informed 
the police officers, after being advised of his rights by the magistrate, that 
his inadmissible written confession was true. The admission of this oral 
affirmation of the inadmissible confession was upheld, because it had been 
rendered by the defendant after the preliminary hearing and receipt of 
judicial cautioning.25 In each of the three cases the court considered the 
circumstances of the later confession to determine whether it was voluntary 
and independent of the earlier inadmissible confession. 
Although the basis for the decision in the principal case is not clearly 
stated, the approach seemingly taken by the court was, once again, to make 
a determination of whether the second confession was voluntary and in-
dependent. The court distinguished Goldsmith and Jackson by construing 
them as requiring that the accused actually have the advice of counsel 
before the subsequent confession was made,26 thus suggesting that the 
advice of counsel in the interim between confessions is indispensable to 
the admission of a subsequent confession. This requirement of counsel, 
coupled with the majority's disregard for the trial judge's determination 
that the subsequent confession was voluntary and independent, lends 
credence to the argument that the principal case does not follow the ac-
cepted procedure of considering all the circumstances of the second con-
fession. Although such a construction is possible, the fact that the court 
distinguishes, rather than overrules, Jackson and Goldsmith21 seems to 
lead to the conclusion that the court did not refute the accepted test, 
but merely re-examined the facts, giving great weight to the absence of 
counsel, and found that the second confession was not voluntary and in-
dependent. 
Either interpretation of the holding in the principal case suggests that 
essentially the same test will be applied whether the subsequent confession 
follows an earlier coerced confession or one that is inadmissible under the 
McNabb-Mallory rule, without any importance being attached to the 
difference in the principles underlying those two doctrines. "What appears 
21 Id. at 541. See Note, 70 YALE L.J. 298 (1960). 
22 277 F.2d 335 (D.C. Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 863 (1961). 
23 285 F.2d 675 (D.C. Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 941 (1961). 
24 Goldsmith v. United States, 277 F.2d 335, 341 (D.C. Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 
U.S. 863 (1961), 74 HA.RV. L. REv. 1222. 
25 Jackson v. United States, 285 F.2d 675, 679 (D.C. Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 
941 (1961), 47 VA. L. REv. 888. 
26 Principal case at 243. 
21 Ibid. 
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to be needed is a clear statement of the thrust and extent of the McNabb-
Mallory rule as applied to subsequent confessions. The admissibility of 
such subsequent confessions should not depend on their being voluntary 
and independent of the first confession, as in the case of confessions sub-
sequent to earlier coerced confessions, but should be founded on the ra-
tionale underlying the McNabb-Mallory rule. Ostensibly, confessions 
obtained during a period of illegal detention are not regarded as being 
coerced; the exclusionary rule is directed at police procedures rather than 
at the effects of police procedures, thus serving general administrative 
purposes rather than the protection of constitutional rights.28 This dis-
tinction is significant, because it is the presence of coercion in the first 
confession which makes the determination of the voluntariness and in-
dependence of the subsequent confession relevant. When the initial con-
fession is coerced the court must consider the effect that the coercion had 
on the defendant thereafter. Illustratively, if the subsequent confession 
was induced by fear of the continuation of past coercion, due process pro-
tection should be extended to prevent introduction into evidence of the 
later admission. However, there can be no continuation of illegal deten-
tion after the defendant has been arraigned. Thus, the only remaining 
rationale for using the "voluntary and independent" test in the McNabb-
Mallory subsequent confession cases is that the accused, having confessed 
once, suffers a psychological disadvantage because he has let "the cat out 
of the bag."29 Although this reasoning has some merit, it is unlikely to 
prevail in view of the fact that the Supreme Court, in Bayer, upheld the 
admissibility of a subsequent confession despite this consideration. More-
over, if the earlier confession was voluntary, and inadmissible only because 
of the illegal detention, the argument that the accused's will to remain 
silent has been broken seems spurious.30 Hence, the admissibility of a con-
fession subsequent to an earlier uncoerced confession, which is inadmissible 
only because of the McNabb-Mallory rule, should be determined by the 
same test which is applied to any confession not within the scope of the 
McNabb-Mallory rule. 
If the "voluntary and independent" standard is deemed to be inappro-
priate in the McNabb-Mallory doctrine area, two additional problems are 
raised. First, what should be done about subsequent confessions when the 
the first confession was obtained by coercive methods during an illegal 
detention? Coerced confessions which are obtained during a period of 
illegal detention should be treated the same as any other coerced confession. 
If the confession made during illegal detention was coerced, then the 
circumstances of a confession made after arraignment should be considered 
28 Hogan &: Snee, McNabb-Mallory Rule: Its Rise, Rationale b Rescue, 47 GEo. L.J. 
1, 7, 29 (1958). 
29 See, e.g., United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 540 (1947); Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 
U.S. 596, 602 (1944). 
so See People v. Jones, 24 Cal. 2d 601, 609, 150 P.2d 801, 805 (1944); Flamme v. State, 
171 Wis. 501, 506, 177 N.W. 596, 598 (1920). 
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to determine whether it was voluntary and independent; however, if the 
earlier confession was inadmissible only because of an illegal delay, the 
subsequent confession should not be affected. Secondly, what force remains 
in the McNabb-Mallory rule if subsequent confessions are admitted with-
out making a finding of voluntariness and independence? In light of the 
limited number of cases where this problem has arisen, and the fact that 
delay in itself might be deemed coercive, a significant circumvention of 
the rule would probably not result. On the other hand, even if the sug-
gested approach does result in a weakening of the rule, the McNabb-
Mallory doctrine is not the only means of enforcing Rule 5(a). In fact, 
if the burden of showing that coercion did not exist during the illegal 
detention were placed on the Government, the result, in most cases, would 
not be different from that achieved under existing law. Consistent with this 
analysis of the admissibility of confessions subsequent to a confession 
barred under the McNabb-Mallory rule, the principal case should still 
be reversed and remanded, but before the subsequent confession is barred 
it should be determined whether coercion existed during the illegal 
detention. The implementation of such an approach for the considera-
tion of all subsequent confessions establishes a uniform rule for all coerced 
confessions, but avoids an illogical extension of the McNabb-Mallory 
doctrine. 
ha]. Jaffe, S.Ed. 
